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National Legal Traditions at Work in the Jurisprudence
of the Court of Justice of the European Uniont
Numerous scholars have commented on the judicial style of
the Court of Justice of the European Union and its non-Herculean
judges, generally disapproving of its minimalist reasoning, lack
of transparency, and failure to draw openly on comparative legal
sources to avoid inconsistencies and weaknesses in its legal reasoning. In a debate where both historians and sociologists have provided new avenues of research, the paucity of comparative lawyers
is surprising because European law is a quintessential example of
a transnationallegal order. Since its inception, Europeanjudges,
advocates general, and lawyers in Luxembourg have drawn inspiration from the different national legal traditions of the member
states through a comparative exegesis of legal rules. In departing
from a comparative exegesis or a legal origins approach, this Article
shows how the Court's decisions often manifest influence from multiple legal systems, suggesting that judges, advocates general, and
lawyers are influenced by-and have reconciled the contradictions
among-nationallegal traditions and judicial styles that acquire
different meanings in the European context. Resorting to national
traditions might be a valuable legal strategy for judges and advocates general seeking to advance new legal concepts, incorporate
new procedures, or reject changes to EU law. Even though there are
inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Court's jurisprudence, by
comparing national legal traditions"at work," they can be explained
as the residue of different legal styles that have come into conflict or
tension over time.
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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),1 safely
"[tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed,
until recently, with benign neglect by the powers that be and the
mass media," 2 has survived over sixty years of name changes,
treaties, institutional reforms, and crises that have percolated
in the European Union.3 The creation of a single Court of Justice,
whose inception lies in the Treaty of Paris in 1951 establishing a
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),4 and later in the
two Treaties of Rome which established the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), 5 was a revolutionary concept that can be traced back
to the 1950 Schuman Declaration.6 Despite different periodizations of the Court's jurisprudence according to various historical 7
and jurisprudentia 8 narratives, activism, or restraint,' commentators and students of EU law find it difficult to navigate through the
CJEU's voluminous maze of rulings, which often exhibit vagueness
or inconsistencies in legal reasoningo because "independent styles
have tended to give way gradually to a new style expressing a certain personality.""
1. The CJEU includes the Court of Justice (hereinafter "the Court") and the
lower court (hereinafter "the General Court"). See Consolidated Version of the Treaty
on European Union, art. 19, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 13 [hereinafter TEU].
2. Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a TransnationalConstitution,
75 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981) (emphasis added).
3. Ditlev Tamm, The History of the Court of Justice of the European Union Since
Its Origin, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND
PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW 9 (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 2013).
4. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140.
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
6. Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France, Declaration made at the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, May 9, 1950 (transcript available
at Declarationof 9 May, FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN, http://www.robert-schuman.
eu/en/declaration-of-9-may-1950). See Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the
Foundationsof European Law, 1950-57: The Legal History of the Treaties of Parisand
Rome, 21 CoNTEMP. Eum. HisT. 339, 340-41 (2012) (explaining how the following sentence in the Schuman declaration was key for the negotiations regarding a possible
judiciary: "[A]ppropriate measures will be provided for means of appeal against the
decisions of the Authority").
7. See Tamm, supra note 3, at 9.
8. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991).
9. See David Edward, JudicialActivism-Myth or Reality? Van Gend en Loos,
Costa v ENEL and the Van Duyn Family Revisited, in LEGAL REASONING AND JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MACKENZIE-STUART 29
(Angus I.L. Campbell & Meropi Voyatzi eds., 1996); TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARnTIVE VIEW 51 (2003).
10. See GUNNAR BECK, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU 52

(2012).
11. Maurice Lagrange, The Court of Justice as a Factorin European Integration,
15 AM. J. Comp. L. 709, 721 (1966).
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Several narratives from across the Atlantic facilitate a better understanding of the Court's legal reasoning, often providing
insight on an international court which began distancing itself
from traditional international courts early on. In the Stein-Weiler
narrative, the Court was no longer an international tribunal, but
rather a constitutional actor at the center of European legal evolution.1 2 Another group, led by political scientists such as Mattili,
Slaughter,"3 Alter, 14 Moravcsik, and Conant,1 5 recast the narrative
as a battle between liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism to make sense of the judicial revolution spurred by the
Court and its interlocutors. More recently, a growing number of
European sociologists have eschewed both approaches in favor of a
map of the legal elites and tools that contributed to the formation
of the European legal profession.1 6 Others have revamped EU legal
history by showing how everyday European practices and leading
figures of Europe's past have important implications for Europe's
future.1 European legal historians have shed light on a constitutional culture that is less of a unitary and coherent legal practice
and more of a fragmented, contested one that has to be understood as a continuous exchange and struggle between Luxembourg,
Brussels, the member states' courts and parliaments, and public
opinion within the member states.18
With few exceptions,1 9 comparative lawyers have contributed
in a limited way to these debates surrounding the CJEU, even
12. See Stein, supra note 2; Weiler, supra note 8.
13. See Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of
Justice, 52 INT'L ORGS. 177 (1995).
14. See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING
OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2003).

15. See Andrew Moravcsik, Preferencesand Power in the European Community:
A Liberal IntergovernmentalistApproach, 31 J. CoMMoN MKT. STUD. 473 (1993); LISA
CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002).
16. See LAWYERING EUROPE: EUROPEAN LAW AS A TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL FIELD

(Antoine Vauchez & Bruno de Witte eds., 2013) (showing the role of lawyers and
their networks in departing from the dominant judicial narrative); ANTOINE VAUCHEZ,
BROKERING EUROPE: EURO-LAWYERS AND THE MAKING OF A TRANSNATIONAL POLITY (2015).

17. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History of European

Law, 21 CONTEMP. EuR. HIsT. 305, 306 (2012).
18. See BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST GERMANY'S
CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 (2012) (showing how Germany has

&

been supportive of, but also a factor of resistance against, European integration
through its courts, diplomacy, and public opinion); Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen,
Towards a New History of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 305 (2012); Morten
Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law: The New Contribution
of Historians, 28 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1187 (2013). For a similar U.S. approach, see
Robert Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 112 (1984).
19. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 203 (2004); Francesca Bignami,
Rethinking the Legal Foundationof the European Constitutional Order: The Lessons
of the New HistoricalResearch, 28 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1311 (2013); Koen Lenaerts,
Interlocking Legal Orders in the European Union and Comparative Law, 52 INT'L
CoMP. L.Q. 873 (2003); Koen Lenaerts, Interpretationand the Court of Justice:A Basis
for Comparative Reflection, 41 INT'L LAW. 1011 (2007); Carol Harlow, Francovich and

the Problem of the Disobedient State, 2 EuR. L.J. 199 (1996).
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though EU jurisprudence is a legal melting pot, providing a laboratory for legal pluralism, 20 convergence, 2 1 reception and circulation
of ideas,2 2 legal transplants, 2 3 cross-influences, resistance, irritation
to legal concepts, 24 and political ideology traveling across different
legal regimes. Since the beginning, judges who studied under different legal regimes (civil or common law inside or outside of Europe)
have come together in Luxembourg and compared national legal traditions, 25 rather than interpret international law norms, as part of
their cognitive apparatus. 26
The reasons are numerous and this topic, alone, could become
a field of inquiry. On the EU law side, the strict compartmentalization of European lawyers, who are often segregated into public or
private practices in legal academia, 27 means they have developed
an obsession with case law in their circumscribed enclaves of EU
law (administrative, criminal, constitutional, business) without systematically exploring judicial styles and nonlegal influences on
EU law. 28 On the comparative law side, especially to scholars who
are not located in Europe, EU law is no longer the epicenter of the
geographical interest of comparative lawyers who expanded their
research beyond the West, tracing the patterns of European colonialism. 2 9 Besides expanding their spatial reach, comparative lawyers
have long departed from exploring the law as presented on the books,
instead choosing to focus on the informal social norms that characterize legal regimes. EU law lost some of its appeal to comparative
lawyers-especially those European legal historians who feel under
pressure due to the growing relevance of global histories 3 0-and as a
20. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAw WITHOUT A STATE 3 (G. Teubner ed., 1997).
21. See John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (andDivergence) of the Civil
Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981).
22. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw 442, 442-61 (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
23. See MAximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004).
24. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998).
25. See Lagrange, supra note 11, at 710-11.
26. See JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 105-06 (1930) (explaining that
part of the cognitive apparatus of judges is reaching an emotional maturity even in a
legal system); THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David E. Klein & Gregory

Mitchell eds., 2010).
27. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI,

JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN
ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION (1967).

&

JOSEPH

M.

PERILLO, THE

28. See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Grdinne de Buirca & J.H.H. Weiler eds.,

2001).

29. See James Q. Whitman, Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking About the Deep
HistoricalRoots, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 305 (2009); UGO MATIEI & LAuRA NADER,
PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW Is ILLEGAL (2008).
30. See REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, ROMAN LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAw, EUROPEAN LAW: THE

CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY (2001); Thomas Duve, European Legal History-Global
Perspectives (Max-Planck-Inst. for Eur. Legal History, Research Paper Series No.
2013-06), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292666.
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consequence, the comparative method as a tool for understanding the
legal reasoning of the CJEU's jurisprudence is no longer informing
current debates. 1
My contribution to this Symposium urges a greater involvement for comparative law scholars in the current literature on
the debates surrounding CJEU jurisprudence, its raison d'dtre, its
cryptic style, and the expanded realm of its jurisdiction. 3 2 By using
a comparative law lens, scholars can shed light on how, at a time
of crisis for Europe, the Court and its comparative legal reasoning remained a relatively stable institution in providing continuity to legal integration-despite EU law's fluctuating acceptance
and resistance by the member states, 3 3 national courtS, 34 and civil
society.35
The absence of a comparative law method in EU law led scholars
to rely on a theory of legal origins, 3 6 based on an economic account
of legal systems which is widely criticized among comparative lawyers. 7 Instead of a historical development, which traces national
legal traditions back to their societal and cultural beginnings, the
legal origins literature 3 8 has created deep biases in contemporary
analyses by drawing correlations between legal traditions taken
out of context and economic outcomes. 3 9 For instance, the idea that
judges are more independent in common law jurisdictions (thus
31. Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its Functions,Methods and Usages, 22
ARK. L. REv. 415 (1968).
32. See JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen & Gert

Straetmans eds., 2013) (assessing the new challenges to the legitimacy of the Court
of Justice in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty).
33. See GEORGE BERMANN, ROGER GOEBEL, WILLIAM DAVEY & ELEANOR Fox, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAw ch. 8 (The Reception of Community Law in the
Member States) (2d ed. 2002).
34. See Michal Bobek, Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the

Court of Justice Through the Eyes of National Courts, in

JUDGING EUROPE'S JUDGES: THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 197.

35. See Case C-346/06, Ruiffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. 1-1989; Case
C-319/06, Comm'n v. Luxembourg, 2008 E.C.R. I-4323; Case C-341/05, Laval un

Partneri Ltd. v. Byggnadsarbetareforbundet, 2007 E.C.R. 1-11767; Case C-438/05,
Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. 1-10779.

36. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins,117 Q.J. EcoN. 1193 (2002).

37. See generally B6n6dicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Is
Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank
Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 811 (2009); Curtis
J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin:Rethinking Law's Relationship to the EconomyImplications for Policy, 57 AM. J. Comp. L. 831 (2009); John K.M. Ohnesorge, China's
Economic Transitionand the New Legal Origins Literature, 14 CHINA ECoN. REV. 485
(2003).
38. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECoN. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
39. See Angela Huyue Zhang & Jingchen Liu, Judging Europe: Do Legal
Traditions Matter? (Transnational Law Inst. Think! Paper 23/2016; King's
College London Law Sch. Research Paper No. 2016-13, 2016), http://ssrn:com/
abstract=2744914 (relying on the oversimplified economic theory of legal origins to
draw assumptions regarding the relationship between legal traditions and judicial
outcomes in state-aid jurisprudence).
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creating a legal system that is more flexible and more harmonious
with market freedoms), as opposed to civil law jurisdictions in which
judges are la bouche de la loi (thus manifesting a legal system primarily focused on state interests), is useful in drawing opposite ideals of the judiciary from which comparative legal analyses added
more sophisticated descriptions. In particular, comparative lawyers
use legal tools such as functionalism, law in action, legal formants,
legal transplants, Weberian ideal types as fiction, legal families, legal
culture, and political ideology4 0 that do not appear in the static and
formalist legal origins comparisons.4 1
Using the comparative literature, Part I of this Article delves into
the debate on the CJEU's opaque and meticulous judicial style, which
has been criticized by commentators for its lack of transpariency and
consistency, as characterized by its secret internal deliberations and
confusing informal procedures. 42 Some commentators have sharpened
their analysis of the CJEU jurisprudence and developed a better understanding by conducting interviews of the judicial bureaucracy at large 4 3
and by demonstrating the relevance of the judicial chambers," the role
of the Article 255 Panel in the selection of judges,41 and the relevance of
the facts of individual cases. Part II uses the national legal traditions
approach to highlight the tensions and reconciliations among judicial
styles in the CJEU's legal reasoning and calls for more comparative
legal work in this vein. Part III departs from a positivist comparative'
exegesis approach and the static legal origins theory, instead focusing
on how different judicial styles have created tensions and inconsistencies or have allowed judges and advocates general to advance new legal
concepts, incorporate new procedures, or reject changes to EU law.

40. See Duncan Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in THE
35 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds.,

CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW

2012) (showing the relevance of legal ideology in comparative law).
41. See MAX WEBER ON LAw IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers?
Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional
Comparative Law, 57 Am. J. CoMp. L. 765 (2009) (explaining how scholars can demonstrate the shotcomings of the legal origins theory through the comparative law
method).
42. See Alberto Alemanno & Oana Stefan, Openness at the Court of Justice of the
European Union: Toppling a Taboo, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 97 (2014); Angela Huyue
Zhang, The Faceless Court, 38 U. PA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2016-2017); J.H.H.
Weiler, Epilogue: Judging the Judges-Apology and Critique, in JUDGING EUROPE'S
JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note

32, at 235.
43. See Mathilde Cohen, Judges or Hostages? The Bureaucratizationof the
Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights,

in EU

LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE

(Bill

Davies & Fernanda G. Nicola eds., forthcoming 2017).
44. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 39, at 14.
45. See Henri de Waele, Not Quite the Bed that Procrustes Built: Dissecting
the System for Selecting Judges at the Court of Justice of the European Union, in
SELECTING EUROPE'S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES TO THE
EUROPEAN COURTS 24 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015).
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EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE BEYOND CIVIL AND COMMON LAW

Judicial Styles

The Court of Justice is tasked with the interpretation and application of the European treaties and follows the procedures outlined
in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 46 Because the Court consists of one judge per member state, its initial group of six judges has
grown to twenty-eight today as a result of the various enlargements
of the EU. This number does not include the eleven advocates general, who assist the Court by providing independent opinions, nor
the judges of the General Court, which is currently in the process of
doubling its numbers in order to keep up with its enormous docket
and create more specialized judges. The reform is also a method for
achieving greater gender parity at the Court as a whole, given the
current imbalance among its members.
In the 1960s, the judicial style of the Court was clearly embedded in the civil law tradition, as its German, French, Italian, and
Benelux judges' Romano-Germanic traditions dominated. This is no
longer the case, however, as the accession of the United Kingdom, the
Scandinavian countries, and the former socialist countries in central
Europe brought significant new styles to which this Article will not
do full justice. In particular, several authors have highlighted how a
court modeled initially on the French Conseil d'Atat has shifted to
such as stare decisis and a more pubusing common law reasoning
licly argumentative style. 4 7
The effect of a common law perspective might affect judges' perception of EU law, such as the Court's commitment to rely primarily
on the treaties or EU legislation rather than on precedent; similarly,
it could affect the language of the Court's judgments, which can be
obscure and cryptic and do not include dissenting or concurring
opinions as common law traditions do, without which it is harder
for commentators to assess any alternative interpretations. The
CJEU's blurred legal reasoning might be explained by its style and
practices, as opposed to a conscious obscurantism on the part of its
judges. Thus the highly praised, though controversial, secrecy of juditoward
cial deliberations might be the result of a civil law inclination
49
"terseness"48 and the ex ante approach to deliberation; it could also
be the result of a careful institutional design decision to give judges
limited terms in office, countering the lifetime appointments typical
of common law jurisdictions.5 0
46. See EU LAW STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 43.

47. See Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudenceof
Doubt?, in PHILOSOPmcAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307, 308 (Julie Dickson
& Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); LASSER, supra note. 19, at 203.
48. See Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet
Russia, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1010 (1974).
49. Mathilde Cohen, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Deliberations:Two Models of
JudicialDeliberationsin Courts of Last Resort, 62 AM. J. Comp. L. 951 (2014).
50. See Mary Clark, JudicialRetirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L.
REv. 841 (2011).
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Since Weiler and De Bilrca's volume appraising the Court's new
judicial architecture apr~s Nice,5 1 the amount of scholarly work
focused on the CJEU has increased exponentially. If the Court was
not previously the sustained center of attention in European Union
legal studies, this has clearly shifted by now. 52 Recent emphasis has
been placed on the selection of judges going to Luxembourg and on
procedures to create an efficient and consistent European jurisprudence-such as the inclusion of twenty-four languages in the bureaucracy and the employment of electronic tools that have reduced
reliance on paper documents.
Finally, all eyes are on the Court with the imminent doubling of the
General Court to fifty-six judges and the abolition of the Civil Service
Tribunal.5 3 In 2009, a working group was established to address the fact
that judges on the General Court were subject to an increased docket
that created procedural delays amounting to five years to decide a routine competition law case, for example. Yet the reform has been criticized by several member states, academics,5 4 and even four judges on
the General Court who opposed the reform without, however, agreeing
on a feasible alternative to it.65 The reform incorporates the judges of
the Civil Service Tribunal into the General Court which, by 2019, will
be composed of two judges from each Member State for a total of fiftysix judges, anticipating a manageable caseload of thirty-one cases a
year, equivalent to that of the Court of Justice.
Another concern expressed by critics is the lack of transparency
of the Court's files, and a desire for the public to have greater and
easier access to these documents.5 1 In December 2015, the Court
of Justice officially opened its archives to the public, a move that
was celebrated as the result of concerted efforts to overcome fears
regarding the loss of confidentiality in a Court that had been thoroughly committed to maintaining the secrecy of its deliberations
from the very start.5 7 In the careful balance between secrecy and
51. Supra note 28.

52. See THE NEw LEGAL DYNAMIcs OF EUROPEAN UNION (Jo Shaw & Gillian More
eds., 1995).
53. See Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 December 2015 Amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court
of Justice of the European Union, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 14.
54. See Daniel Sarmiento, The Reform of the General Court: Unleashing the
Forces of Change, DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES [BLOG] (Dec. 15, 2015), https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2015/12/15/the-reform-of-the-general-court-unleashing-the-forces-of-change/; Alberto Alemanno & Laurent Pech, Where Do We Stand
on Reform of EU's Court System, EU LAW ANALYSIS BLOG (Sept. 22, 2015), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/09/where-do-we-stand-on-reform-of-eus.html.
55. See Franklin Dehousse with the collaboration of Benedetta Marsicola, The
Reform of the EU Courts (II):Abandoning the Management Approach by Doubling
the General Court (Egmont-Royal Inst. for Int'l Relations, Paper No. 83, Mar. 2016),
http://egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ep83.pdf.pdf.
56. See Alemanno & Stefan, supra note 42.
57. See Consolidated Version of Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Union, art. 2, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 210 ("Before taking up his
duties each Judge shall, before the Court of Justice sitting in open court, take an oath
to perform his duties impartially and conscientiously and to preserve the secrecy of
the deliberations of the Court.").
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transparency-or, as President Lenaerts puts it, between "the proper
functioning of the judicial proceedings and openness"-the pendulum
has shifted towards increasing openness and better understanding of

the CJEU. 6

In the civil law tradition, judges, at least at the declaratory
level, are mere interpreters of a piece of legislation or codes, writing in a style that is succinct and short, but otherwise they have
more discretion than their common law counterparts. Another
classic explanation of the civil law style of judicial interpretation
is the distinction between doctrinal and authentic interpretation
of law. Whereas the latter is a positivist interpretation, the doctrinal interpretation draws on scholarly work and can be traced
back to Roman law, when the opinions of legal scholars or jurisconsults were vital to the process and became valuable precedent.
These opinions also played a central role in a revival of the abstract
meaning of legal concepts in the jus commune in Europe, thanks
to the role of jurists who opposed the jus proprium as characterized by the variety of local laws. 5 9 By turning away from scholarly
commentaries, judges focused their attention on the Corpus Juris
Civilis and the authority of the Emperor-similar to the shift a few
centuries later in 1804 with the Code Napoldon. In both cases, as
Merryman points out, "the number and diversity of doctrinal points
of view and the mass and varying quality of doctrinal writing were
60
described as evils to be corrected by compilation and codification."
While civil law courts rely on the secrecy of their decision-making
process to maintain authority, common law courts struggle with
their legitimacy and must justify their policy choices to the bar, the
bench, and the world.6 1
B.

Critiques and Responses

There is a common lament regarding the jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice that, despite its increasing prominence and relevance in Europe and around the globe, it receives relatively little
scholarly attention, and the number of students interested in EU law
62
is declining, especially in the United States. A classic explanation is
positivist and dogmatic, 6 3
be
to
that European legal reasoning tends
58. See Opening of the HistoricalArchives of the European Court of Justice,
E.U. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.eui.

EUR. UNIV. INST.: HISTORICAL ARCHIVES OF THE

eulResearch/HistoricalArchivesOfEU/News/2015/12-17-Official-opening-of-theEuropean-Court-of-Justices-papers.aspx.
59. See MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE 1000-1800, at 99-100
(Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 2d ed. 1995).
60. John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style III: Interpretation, 18 STAN. L. REV.

583, 585 (1966).
61. See Rudden, supra note 48, at 1016.
62. See Daniela Caruso, European Union Law in US. Legal Academia, 20 TuL.

&

J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175 (2011).
63. Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The TransatlanticDivergence in Legal
Thought:American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism,31 HASTINGS INT'L

CoMP. L. REV 295, 303 (2008).
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compartmentalized,"6 and formalist. 65 Other explanations criticize the lack of transparency in the Court's decisions and style, and
accuse it of promoting vague judicial reasoning by refusing either to
include dissenting and concurring opinions 66 or to explain the foreign
or comparative legal sources on which it relies.67 Finally, others have
shed light on the more fundamental problem of EU law scholarship
not engaging critically with the Court, due in part to the tendency of
such scholarship to disregard "other" legal disciplines, including comparative law, critical legal theory, and postcolonial studies.68
This Article sheds light on how national legal traditions have
contributed to the style and creation of different sites of authority
and resistance to EU law, due to its unique mutual dependence on
national and trasnational legal orders. 69
II.

NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS IN EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE

The study of legal traditions in the twenty-first century is often
relegated to the field of legal historians 7 0 or to the job of revamping
non-Western legal traditions." Yet, some of the major differences in
judicial interpretation still matter today, and as a famous legal historian stated,

CAPPELLETII, MERRYMAN & PERILLO, supra note 27, at 56.
65. Christian Joerges & Florian Rodl, On De-formalisationin EuropeanPolitics
and Formalism in European Jurisprudencein Response to the "SocialDeficit" of the
European Integration Project:Reflections After the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking
and Laval, 4 HANSE L. REV. 3 (2008).
66. See V.F. Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49
VA. J. INT'L L. 307 (2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial
Dissent: Causes and Consequences (n.d.), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/
download/84 (unfinished draft paper prepared for presentation at the European
Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, Mar. 5-7, 2015).
67. Grdinne de B1rca, After the EU Charterof FundamentalRights: The Court
of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168
(2013); Christopher McCrudden, Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights
Adjudication: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of
Human Rights Compared, 15 CAMBRIDGE YB. Eua. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2013).
68. See Giorgio Gaja, Aspetti problematici della tutela dei diritti fondamentali nell'ordinamento comunitario, in NUOVE DIMENSIONI NEI DIRITrI DI LIBERTA: ScRIrrI
IN ONORE DI PAOLO BARILE 621 (1990); Judge Siniga Rodin, Court of Justice of the
European Union, A Metacritique of the Court of Justice of the EU, Talk at the
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, Conference on Legal Certainty and the CJEU
(Nov. 2, 2015), available at http://www.biicl.org/documents/772 rodins-paper 2015.
pdf; DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SItCLE) (1997); Fernanda
G. Nicola, Transatlanticisms:Constitutional Asymmetry and Selective Reception
of US. Law and Economics in the Formation of European Private Law, 16 CARDOZO
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 87 (2008) (demonstrating the selective reception of U.S. law and
economics within EU law).
69. See Armin von Bogdandy, The Transformation of European Law: The
Reformed Concept and Its Quest for Comparison (Max Planck Inst. for Comparative
Pub. Law & Int'l Law Research Paper No. 2016-14, 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2783702.
70. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE: UNITY AND
DIVERSITY OVER Two MILLENNIA (2002).
71. See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (5th ed. 2010).
64.
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age-old English instinct is to say, with Lord Denning,
'trust the judges, for they are the true guardians of the law'.
The German feeling, which also goes back several centuries,
is to say, with Savigny, 'trust the learned jurists, for they are
the best guides through the thickets of the law'. The French
instinct, on the other hand, is to say, in true Jacobin and
Napoleonic vein, 'trust the legislator and beware of judges
and jurists who pervert the codes'. As none of these traditions is the sole road to salvation, a truly European law
ought to contain the most helpful elements of each one of
them.72
This challenge was also obvious to the eleven "Founding
Fathers of Europe." It was clear that a court tasked with promoting and upholding justice in the new melting pot of traditions of the
European Community would have to be able to reconcile its different legal traditions and, more importantly, build on the cross-influence and dialogue of the Romano-Germanic system. 7 374 In 1957, one
of the early cases before the Court of Justice, Algera, presented a
problem that the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community did not account for regarding the repeal of an earlier,
illegal decision. This is a common problem in administrative law,
entailing either the nullity or revocability of the measure at stake.
Here, the Court had to resort to consulting the national legal traditions and the Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange to find a solufurther ado, the
tion. Ultimately, "the Court adopted, without much
solution adopted in French administrative law."75
More than ten years later, another well-known example is
InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,76 in which the Court reaffirmed
its doctrine of supremacy while simultaneously holding that fundamental rights were "an integral part of the general principles"
of European law, as supported by the opinion of Advocate General
Duthellier de Lamothe77 and the Commission's Legal Service, represented by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann.7 8 The Court grandiosely insisted
on the protection of fundamental rights that were absent in the
72. See VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 70, at 135.
73. See J6r6me Wilson, Jurisconsulteset conseillers d'Etat: aux originesde l'ordre
INTEGRATION HIST., no. 2, 2008, at 35.
74. Joined Cases 7/56 & 3-7/57, Dineke Algera, Giacomo Cicconardi, Simone
Couturaud, Ignazio Genuardi & F61icie Steichen v. Common Assembly of the
European Coal and Steel Community, 1957 E.C.R. 81.
75. Tim Koopmans, The Court of Justice and National Legal Traditions, in LA

juridique communautaire, 14 J. Eun.

COUR DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPtENNES

1952-2002:

BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES; ACTEs

DE LA CONFERENCE ORGANIStE DANS LE CADRE DU CINQUANTI9ME ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA COUR DE

JUSTICE

15, 17 (2004).

76. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle ffir Getriede und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
77. Id., Opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe, at 1146-47.
78. See Bill Davies, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the Miscalculation
at the Inception of the ECJ's Human Rights Jurisprudence, in EU LAW STORIES:
CoNTETuAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 43.

876

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 64

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, stating
that, "whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the
member states, [they] must be ensured within the framework of the
structure and objectives of the Community." 9
Since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 199380 and
later in Article 4(2) TEU in the Treaty of Lisbon,81 the constitutionalization of this principle clearly states that the EU must respect the
national identities of the member states, so that CJEU judges will
interpret this provision by balancing derogations from national laws
in favor of EU law through proportionality analyses.82
A.

The French Tradition

France was one of the Founding Members and six signatories
of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, and it historically influenced the
legal systems of Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy.
Two important characteristics have been traced back to the French
legal tradition: (1) the reduction of judges to bureaucrats, especially after the adoption of the Code Napoldon, which represents the
supremacy of the legislature over the judiciary, and (2) the prestige
of French administrative law, with the Conseil d'Etat as the highest
administrative branch that remained indifferent to Europeanization
until 2007.83 Both are important descriptive factors, but still tell us

very little about the influence of the French legal tradition on the
legal reasoning of the CJEU. Mitchel Lasser tells part of this story
by identifying a pattern of hostility in the reception of the European
legal system by French judges, lawyers, and jurists through the
ascendance of fundamental rights jurisprudence that connected both
systems and changed domestic social norms. 84 The reverse story,
however, which is aimed at tracing how French legal ideas, personalities, and culture deeply influenced European jurisprudence, has
been studied less by comparative lawyers than by historians.8 5
French, as the working language of the Court, has become a central feature of Luxembourg because all cases before the Court must
be translated into this language, a time-consuming process. 8 6 Yet it
79. Case 11/70, InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft,1970 E.C.R. at 1134.
80. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
81. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 4(2), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
82. See Theodore Konstadinides, Dealing with ParallelUniverses:Antinomies of
Sovereignty and the Protectionof National Identity in EuropeanJudicialDiscourse,
34 Y.B. EUR. L. 127 (2015).
83. See Oreste Pollicino, The Conseil d'Etat and the Relationship Between French
InternalLaw After Arcelor: Has Something Really Changed?,45 ColMMoN MKr. L. REV.
1519, 1524 (2008).
84. See MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 90 (2009).
85. See THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A TRANS- AND SUPRANATIONAL
POLITY 1950-72 (Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht & Morten Rasmussen eds., 2008).

86. See Interview with Judge Sacha Prechal of the European Court of Justice:
Part I: Working at the CJEU, EUR. L. BLOG (Dec. 18, 2013), http://europeanlawblog.
eu/9p=2115.
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87
also encourages cultural expression and technical precision. While
the applicant can use any of the twenty-four official languages for
her claim before the Court, the claim must be translated into French.
Of course, the use of French, a required working language for the
judges but not necessarily the advocate general, has also triggered
criticism about its effects in making the process longer, skewing
the applicant pool, and excluding more qualified judges due to the
88
decline of French as a second language worldwide.
In his contribution to a colloquium organized by the Association
89
amicale des rdfirendairesde la Cour de justice, Tim Koopmans
on
demonstrated that French legal tradition was a strong influence
90
the Court's decision in the so-called Cassis de Dijon ruling. The
case concerned the sale of a French-produced blackcurrant liqueur
called Cassis de Dijon in Germany. Cassis de Dijon contains 15-20%
alcohol by volume and could not qualify as fruit liqueur under
German regulations, which stipulated that such products must contain at least 25% alcohol by volume. Germany told the importer of
Cassis de Dijon that it could import, but not market, its product in
Germany. The Court held that this regulation had "an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports" in breach of Article 34
91
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Here, the Court used French legal tradition to construe free-movement-of-goods jurisprudence, even before launching on the Single
92
Market project.
93
Instead of detecting the legal origins of this judgment, EU legal
scholars lament that Cassis de Dijon follows "non-revolutionary"
jurisprudence,9 4 meaning that the entire internal market jurisprudence of the CJEU had to draw lines between the application of the
four freedoms and the autonomy of member states' protective regulations, which is based on "open-ended concepts" and the "absence of

87. See Michael Bobek, Epilogue: Searching for the European Hercules, in
SELECTING EUROPE'S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCEDURES TO THE
EUROPEAN COURTS, supra note 45, at 279, 309.

88. See id.

&

89. See Koopmans, supra note 75, at 18.
90. Case C-120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
91. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 34, June 7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] ("Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to
the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States.").
92. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Kir Forever? The Journey of a PoliticalScientist in the
Landscape of Mutual Recognition, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF
EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 447 (Miguel Maduro
Loic Azoulai eds., 2010); J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitutionof the Common Market Place:
Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods, in THE EVOLUTION OF
EU LAW 349, 350 (Paul Craig & Grdinne de Birca eds., 1999).
93. Political scientists and historians have completed important work on this
subject. See Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier-Aitsahalia, Judicial Politics in the
European Community: European Integrationand the Path-BreakingCassis de Dijon
Decision, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 535 (1994).
94. See Allan Rosas, Life After Dassonville and Cassis: Evolution but No
Revolution, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON
THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY, supra note 92, at 433.
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precise underpinning definitions."9 5 However, this is precisely what
comparative lawyers can detect. Just like in the French legal system, there are implied principles which characterize the entire legal
system across its different codes, such as "freedom of trade."" While
under the French constitution, Parliament can depart from these
principles through legislation, the administration is bound by them
through its secondary legislation. Koopmans explains the clear parallelism in Cassis de Dijon:
The term was absent in the initial text of the Treaty provisions, but these provisions, though only referring to tariffs,
quantitative restrictions, measures of equivalent effect etc.,
amount to establishing free movement of goods within the
Community. The Cassis de Dijon line of case law is entirely
based on this general principle.97
In Cassis de Dijon, discriminatory national provisions that favor
domestic traders over importers were held not to be an obstacle
to free movement when they can be justified as necessary to satisfy "mandatory requirements," an unfortunate translation from
the French expression exigences impiratives.9 8 The Cassis de Dijon
Court thus stated the principle of freedom of commerce and its
exception, governed by a fundamental rule of reason: the principle
of proportionality between the mandatory interest at stake (often a
local gain) and the burden that the interest imposes on interstate
commerce.
This proportionality test -has encouraged the Court, as Kalypso
Nicolaidis has colorfully expressed it, to step back
from the recognition abyss even in the beverage and foods
department, as with cheese additives (Nisin) banned by
the Dutch. No matter that most Europeans, indeed most
human beings, while they delight in very different tastes,
find the same poisons poisonous. Even then, different publics, consumers, societies might accept different levels of
risk. And when the Court did strike with a duty of recognition-it did often enough to ensure the free movement of
beer, butter, oil and pasta-not everyone was happy. "Ah,
I cannot recognize as pasta anything which comes so gluey

95. See Stephen Weatherill, The Court's.Case Law on the Internal Market:
A CircumloquaciousStatement of the Result, Rather than a Reason for Arriving at It,
in JUDGING EUROPE's JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE, supra note 32, at 87, 90.
96. See JEAN-MARIE PONTIER, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX ET LIBERT8S PUBLIQUES (5th
ed. 2010) (deriving the principle of liberty of commerce and industry directly
from the French Revolution and observing that it is often used by the Conseil
d'ttat).
97. Koopmans, supra note 75, at 18.
98. Case C-120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fir

Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
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out of the pot," a well-loved Italian ECJ judge confided in
me the other day.99
The story behind Cassis de Dijon is one of, as Nicolaidis puts it,
"managed" mutual recognition that departs from some of the founding myths of European integration as driven by a neoliberal conspiracy at the supranational level. 100 In essence, the Luxembourg judges
were aware that the Cassis de Dijon doctrine had wider implications
than freedom of commerce, but in light of the German and American
test
federal experiences, they knew they were establishing a market
101 The
law.
public
and
private
for
implications
with longstanding
Germans worried about the implications of this judgment regarding
the competence of the Court to regulate interstate commerce, and thus
the German government put pressure on the Commission to come up
with a plan. 10 2 Unsurprisingly, Cassis de Dijon originated from a preliminary question of the Hesse Financial Court questioning the compatibility of German law with Article 34 TFEU on the prohibition of
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions
on trade.
The introduction of proportionality at the end of the Cassis de
Dijon doctrine-to reconcile opposing views such as individualism
versus community, authority versus liberty, welfarism versus neoliberalism, and European versus member state competence-was the outcome of a compromise reviving balancing tests among European jurists
who had long shared a common faith in this form of legal reasoning.
Towards a Romano-GermanicModel: The German Tradition
The German tradition has been invoked in EU law either in a
simplistic way to say that CJEU judges have more discretion than
French ones 103 or in a sophisticated way to show how the attitude
of German judges is less rule-conscious and more interested in the
"dialectical relationship between the facts and the law" than is the
case in France. 1 04 Unsurprisingly, the jurisprudence of the CJEU
has become more attentive to the facts of each case and its judgments have become less abstract. This attitude can be traced back
to the German Historical School under the legacy of Friedrich Carl
von Savigny, who revamped the Roman law tradition in Germany

B.

99. Kalypso Nicolaidis, The Cassis Legacy: Kir, Banks, Plumbers, Drugs,
Criminals and Refugees, in EU LAw STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL HISTORIES OF
EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 43 (manuscript at 7 n.10) (explaining how Cassis
de Dijon was a real departure from Dassonville).
100. Id. at 344.
101. See Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm
of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. Cour. & INT'L L. 149
(2004).
102. See Brigitte Leucht, The History of the Cassis de Dijon Judgment,
Presentation at the European University Institute Conference: Setting an Agenda for
Historical Research in European Law (Dec. 11, 2015) (presentation notes on file with
author).
103. See Zhang & Liu, supra note 39, at 9.
104. Koopmans, supra note 75, at 19.
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and opposed codification.10 5 The Historical School positioned itself
against the Acole de l'Exdghse, which supported French jurists'
strict adherence to the texts of the codes. 10 6 However, comparative lawyers have demonstrated how Savigny's legacy in legal reasoning goes beyond the German-French divide, 107 and there are
at least two noteworthy features in the evolution of a European
jurisprudence.
The first is that Savigny's Historical School had a very strong
legal and social connotation through the notion of a Volksgeist as
the common consciousness of the people. 108 Therefore, in EU law
the notion of "community" is often associated with the Germanic
tradition, leading to notions such as greater freedom for judges
and the primacy of social interests as opposed to individual
ones. 109
A second feature of Savigny's legacy was the incorporation of
1 0 into
Roman lawo
his reconstruction of a classical legal thought
based on abuse of deduction and individual rights, expressed
through private property and freedom of contract.' This formalist strand of nineteenth-century legal thought had followers in
both France and Germany until the rejection of classical legal
thought and its legal deductive reasoning in the early twentieth
century. Rudolf von Jhering's critique of individual sovereignty
brought into question the coherence of legal reasoning, arguing
that sovereignty was not a matter of deductive interpretation but'
was instead rooted in mechanical social causes that were motivated by human ends. 112 French jurists such as Francois G6ny,
Eduard Lambert, and Louis Josserand developed, as a reaction to
the formalist thinking of the classical era, some canons of sociological jurisprudence. 1 13 Both Jhering and G6ny criticized dogmatic
interpretation and advocated in favor of balance and proportionality without fully developing the implications of this central legal

105. See Mathias Reimann, The HistoricalSchool Against Codification:Savigny,
Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. Comp. L. 95, 97-98 (1989).
106. See EVA

STEINER, FRENCH LAw: A CoMPARATIVE APPROACH 194 (2010).

107. See Duncan Kennedy, Savigny's Family/Patrimony Distinction and Its Place
in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 Ae. J. COMP. L. 811 (2010);
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence(II): The Logic of Legal Transplants,43
Am. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995).
108. See FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY [sic], OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., London, Littlewood & Co.

1831).
109. See
(2007).

JOHN H. MERRYMAN

& ROGELIo

PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION

39

110. See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAw (William
Holloway trans., Madras, J. Higginbotham 1867).
111. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought: 18502000, in THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 32-35

(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
112. See RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (John J. Lalor trans., 2d ed.

1915).
113. See Marie Claire Belleau, The "Juristes Inquiets": Legal Classicism and
Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379.
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developed by American jurists such as
theory which were further
Oliver Wendell Holmes.1 14
Both features fed the Romano-Germanic tradition and were
central to reconciling the differences existing between the French
and German legal traditions, from which similarities could11also
5
be distilled as derived from a revamped Roman legal order. To
the European founders, those jurists able to navigate both traditions-having reconciled differences and similarities in the
best comparative legal tradition 1 6 through their exposure to
both French and German legal education-were better suited
to become the judges and advocates general of a court with a
European sensibility." 7 The work of legal historians has shed
light on the biographies of judges and advocates general, as well
as on Michel Gaudet, the Commission's Legal Service director and
a central figure in the creation of the direct effect doctrine in Van
Gend en Loos."'
Among the stellar recipients of the Romano-Germanic tradition
were jurists educated in both systems such as Maurice Lagrange,
the spiritual father of Michel Gaudet; Pierre Pescatore, the
Luxembourg judge;I 9 and the Italian private law professor Alberto
Trabucchi.1 2 0 After distancing himself from the racist Vichy regime
where he worked on the adoption of laws excluding Jews from the
civil service, Lagrange served in 1949 in a mission to "democratize"
the German public service with American authorities in Berlin.121
He was then recruited by Jean Monnet from the Conseil d'Etat and
114. See Duncan Kennedy, A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionalityin

Private Law, in

THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW

185, 195-200 (Roger

Brownsword, Hans Micklitz, Leone Niglia & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2011) (observing that G~ny and Jhering deployed balancing as a critique of deductive reasoning
while others, such as Rend Demogue and Phillippe Heck, developed proportionality
theories).
115. See J~r6me Wilson, Aux origines de l'ordrejuridiquecommunautaire, in UNE
CONSTITUTION POUR UN PROJET ET DES VALEURS 11 (Christian Franck & Sandra Boldrini

eds., 2004).
116. See
ed. 1998).
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(3d

117. See Wilson, supra note 115, at 17.
118. Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en
Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. (SPECIAL ED.) 1. See Morten Rasmussen,
Revolutionizing EuropeanLaw: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment, 12 INT'L
J. CONST. L. 136 (2014); Anne Boerger & Morten Rasmussen, Influence from the Sideline:
Michel Gaudet and the Early Development of European Law, Presentation at the
European University Institute Conference: Setting an Agenda for Historical Research in
European Law (Dec. 10, 2015) (presentation notes on file with author).
119. See Vera Fritz, Pierre Pescatore: An Activist of European Integration
Through Law, Presentation at the European University Institute Conference: Setting
an Agenda for Historical Research in European Law (Dec. 10, 2015) (presentation
notes on file with author); Corinne Schroeder & J6r6me Wilson, Euroam esse construendam: Pierre Pescatore und die anfdnge der europaischen rechtsordnung, 18
HISTORISCHE MITTErLUNGEN 162 (2005).
120. See LA FORMAZIONE DEL DIRITTO EUROPEO: GIORNATA DI STUDIO PER ALBERTO
TRABUCCHI NEL CENTENARIo DELLA NASCITA (Marco Azzalini & Claudia Sandei eds.,

2009).
121. See

MARC-OLIVIER BARUCH, SERVIR L'tTAT FRANQAIS: LA HAUTE FONCTION PUBLIQUE
sous VICHY (1997).
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became one of the "legal architects" of the European community in
drafting the Treaty of Paris, subsequently becoming the first advocate general of the Court from 1953 to 1964.122 Lagrange paved the
way for the "judicialization" of the Court and, by departing from
mere textualism or a diplomatic approach to international law, he
was behind some of the most important constitutional decisions of
the Court. 123 He contributed to the "silent revolution" by promoting
a teleological federalism for "a federal Court that will have no need
to borrow its judicial system from overseas, but will quite naturally
find its original foundations in the best of the legal experience of its
124
own members."

Well known for his famous opinions in cases such as Costa
v. Enel (which established the primacy of EU law), the federalist
Lagrange relied on the comparative legal method as early as 1955
when, as advocate general of the Court of Justice of the European
Coal and Steel Community, he stated that "[a]s regards the sources
of that law, there is obviously nothing to prevent them being sought,
where appropriate, in international law, but normally, and in most
cases, they will be found rather in the internal law of the various
Member States."1 25 Later on, Lagrange embraced what he called a
"global" method of interpretation for the Court, which, since its very
first judgment, had embraced, albeit tentatively, the notion that
judges were driven by rules applied by national courts rather than
the "usual vagaries" of the international courts. 126
Beyond the principle of proportionality in the famous Cassis formula, the Court drew inspiration from common principles of legality developed by the member states in their administrative law
practice.12 7 As Koopmans relates, the prominent German notion of
Verhdltnisma/3igkeit, "a British member of the Court once explained
to English judges, [means] that you do not crack a nut with a sledgehammer." 12 8 The principle of proportionality was further developed
in famous cases involving beer purity and Italian vinegar, in which
freedom of movement prevailed over domestic restrictions -deemed
122. See Antonin Cohen, Scarlet Robes, Dark Suits: The Social Recruitment of the
European Court of Justice 5 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Working Paper RSCAS 2008/35, 2008),
http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/10029; NOREEN BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, THE
ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAw 59 (2007).
123. VAUcHEz, supra note 16, at 52-53.
124. Cohen, supra note 122, at 5 (translating from Maurice Lagrange, La Cour de
Justice de la Communautd europdenne du charbon et de l'acier, 70 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'TRANGER 417, 435 (1954)).
125. Case 8/55, F~d6ration Charbonnibre de Belgique v. High Auth., Opinion of
Advocate General Lagrange, 1956 E.C.R. 245, 277 (original emphasis removed).
126. Maurice Lagrange, The Court of Justice of the European Communities
from the Schuman Plan to the European Union 7 (1979), CVCE [CENTRE
VIRTUEL

DE

LA CONNAISSANCE

SUR

L'EUROPEJ,

http://www.cvce.eu/content/

publication/1999/1/1/30dbbbO2-97f2-46ad-898c-49b074cb2ab2/publishable-en.pdf,
translatedfrom 2 M9LANGES FERNAND DEHOUSSE: LA CONSTRUCTION EUROPPENNE 127
(1979).
127. See Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of
Legal Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 497 (1991).
128. Id. at 501.
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too zealous in their protection of German and Italian consumers.129
In doing so, the common faith in balancing as derived from the
German and French legal traditions was revamped by European
judges through the comparative method. 130 At the time, balancing
appeared to be a lifesaver to the federalists, who knew that the most
pressing legal challenge for the European Community was how to
reconcile different legal traditions that, unlike the thirteen U.S. colonies, did not share a common legal system. 131
C.

Looking Across the Atlantic: The US. Legal Tradition in
EuropeanJurisprudence

In a post-war Europe undergoing legal reconstruction, judges
were looking across the Atlantic while U.S. jurists and diplomats
were interested in influencing the development of the newly established European jurisprudence. For example, the American scholar
Eric Stein, 132 a proponent of the constitutional narrative of EU
law, was also a close friend of Michel Gaudet and an habitud at the
Commission, with an office in the Legal Service building in Brussels
in which he spent his research semester.133 According to Brigitte
Leucht, the scholarly attention paid to the evolution of the U.S.
Supreme Court's development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine1 34 was, for instance, very relevant to the Dutch scholar
Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, later advocate general in the 1980s,
who was in the circle of authorities advising the Internal Market
Directorate-General of the European Commission following the
Cassis ruling.1 35

129. Case 178/84, Comm'n v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227; Case
193/80, Comm'n v. Italy, 1981 E.C.R. 3019. See Koopmans, supra note 127, at 501.
130. See Pierre Pescatore, Le recours, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice
des Communautis europdennes, e des normes deduites de la comparaisondes droits
des ltats membres, 32 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 337 (1980).
131. See Koopmans, supra note 127, at 493.
132. See Anne Boerger, At the Cradle of Legal Scholarshipon the European Union:
The Life and Early Work of Eric Stein, 62 Am. J. Comr. L. 859 (2014).
133. See Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of
European Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 195265, 21 CONTEMP. Eun. HIsT. 375, 376 (2012); Boerger & Rasmussen, supra note 119.
134. The Dormant Commerce Clause is a legal doctrine that courts in the
United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the United
States Constitution, which expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause is an implied, negative converse grant of
power-it prohibits states from enacting legislation that improperly burdens or
discriminates against interstate commerce. This legal doctrine originated in the
dicta of Chief Justice John Marshall. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
189 (1824), he wrote that the power to regulate interstate commerce "can never be
exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or
lie dormant."
135. See Leucht, supra note 102, at 8 (showing the intellectual legacy of jurists
such as Alfonso Mattera at the Commission, in the Directorate-General for Internal
Market; Michel Waelbroeck, a member of the Brussels bar; and Pieter VerLoren van
Themaat, professor of social and economic law at the University of Utrecht (1967-81)
and advocate general at the Court of Justice (1981-1986)).
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Obviously, U.S. legal reasoning influenced the Cassis court, and
scholars like Miguel Maduro13 6 and Donald Regan1 7 have pointed out
that there is a clear parallel between the CJEU jurisprudence on Article
34 TFEU and the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, specifically the establishment of a balancing test in Pike,138 which was
decided nine years before Cassis. Identifying functional differences and
similarities, Maduro shows that the higher scrutiny applied to national
measures in Cassis through proportionality is different from the U.S.
Supreme Court's inclination to strike down protectionist measures in
its context of a market from which there is no "exit" and in which both
Congress and federal agencies provide further means of integration.
A legal explanation of the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent
departure from the Pike test can be found in the loss of faith in proportionality after the 1980s with the ascendance of the Rehnquist
court, 139 followed by a more conceptual and neoformalist understanding of rights coupled with the rise of legal economics. 14 0 A similar
skepticism emerged in European jurisprudence only a few decades
later when, right before the financial crisis of 2007, the balancing of
fundamental rights with economic freedoms by the European Court of
Justice revealed that proportionality was not always able to tame the
privatization and liberalization of services in the European market. 14 1
Even though more work is needed, the literature tracing the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court on the legal reasoning of the CJEU is
expanding. At times, the advocates general's opinions reveal this openly,
through citations to their U.S. counterparts; 142 at other times, scholars
have traced the direct or indirect impact of U.S. jurisprudence as either

&

136. See Miguel Maduro, Revisiting the Free Movement of Goods in a Comparative
Perspective, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND
PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASE-LAW, supra note 3, at 485.
137. See Donald H. Regan, An Outsider's View of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon,
in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAw: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAw REVISITED ON THE 50TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE RoME TREATY, supra note 92, at 465, 466 & n.113. See also Donald
H. Regan, JudicialReview of Member-State Regulation of Trade Within a Federal or
Quasi-FederalSystem: Protectionismand Balancing, Da Capo, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1853,
1893 (2001).
138. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
139. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (departing from the balancing test of the majority and from judicial
precedent in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), to limit the
reach of the Dormant Commerce Clause and uphold national law as not facially discriminatory-similar to the holding in Joined Cases C-267/91 & C-268/91, Keck
Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097).
140. See Kennedy, supra note 114, at 217 (explaining why there was a retreat from
balancing tests in the United States for both liberals and conservatives after the
1980s).
141. See Sybe de Vries, Balancing FundamentalRights with Economic Freedoms
According to the European Court of Justice, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 169 (2013) (commenting on Case C-341/05, Laval un PartneriLtd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefirbundet,
2007 E.C.R. 1-11767 and Case C-438/05, InternationalTransport Workers' Federation
v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. 1-10779).
142. See the opinions of Advocate General Francis Jacobs in Case C-67/96, Albany
InternationalBV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, and Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R.
1-7791, and the opinion of Advocate General Antonio Saggio in Case C-126/97, EcoSwiss, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055.
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a model or counter-model in the work of judges, lawyers, and jurists contributing to the migration of legal ideas across the Atlantic.14
III.

NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS "AT WORK" IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CJEU

While important studies have taken the Europeanization of
domestic law into consideration by creating change, irritation, or
resistance in the legal systems of the member states,1 4 this Article
addresses the opposite phenomenon-namely, how the evolution of
EU law can be traced back to national legal traditions that acquire
different meanings and create tensions and inconsistencies at particular historical moments.
The national legal traditions at work, just like the "ontological
identities" in European adjudication, as Judge Rodin calls them, provide a lens through which to examine how judges exercise their freedom and constraint in adjudication. 14 However, to do so, we must
understand national legal traditions beyond the "existential angst"
of the legal origins literature.14 6 Comparative lawyers can compartmentalize legal traditions by describing them as linear and static, or
instead show how they "work" by shaping and blending EU law or
departing from European jurisprudence. The traditions I sketched
above are only an initial sample intended to urge comparative lawyers to further trace the contributions of judges or advocates general
from former socialist countries and draw more sophisticated distinctions among judges in continental legal traditions.
A.

The Strategic Use of Legal Traditions

With the accession of Denmark and the United Kingdom in
1973, followed in 1995 by Sweden and Finland, the predominant
influence of the civil law traditions on the Court came to an end and
the common law and Scandinavian traditions began to play a role.
Judges in England, in the absence of comprehensive legislation,
make the law while constrained by their own precedents and are
keen to look at facts to induce their legal reasoning.1 47 When looking at law in action, however, comparativists have shown that civil
143. See loanna Tourkochoriti, Jenkins v. Kingsgate and the Migration of the US.
DisparateImpact Doctrine in EU Law, in EU LAw STORIES: CONTEXTUAL AND CRITICAL
HISTORIES OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 43; Julie C. Suk, DisparateImpact
Abroad, in A NATION OF WIDENING OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, at 283
(Samuel Bagenstos & Ellen Katz eds., 2014).
144. See THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE MEMBER STATES
(Hans-W. Micklitz & Bruno De Witte eds., 2012); EU LAW IN THE MEMBER STATES:
VIKING, LAVAL AND BEYOND (Mark Freedland & Jeremias Prass1 eds., 2014); Stephen
Weatherill, Can There Be Common Interpretationof European Private Law?, 31 GA.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 139 (2002).
145. See, in this Symposium, Siniga Rodin, ConstitutionalRelevance of Foreign
Court Decisions, 64 AM. J. Comp. L. 815 (2016).
146. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and the Legal Origins
Thesis: "[Non scholae sed vitae discimus", 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 863 (2009).
147. See Rudden, supra note 48, at 1020.
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law codes contain gaps and ambiguities. For instance, French judges
have filled these gaps and substantively contributed to the evolution
of tort law in a way that creates more similarities with their common
law counterparts. 14 8 In contrast, the common law is more formulaic
and, with its writs, creates procedural constraints through which to
collect evidence and present legal claims or legal defenses that serve
to protect individual rights, especially through judicial review of
legislation. 149
The influence of the common law began showing its effects in
the CJEU's more careful analysis of its own precedents, which by the
1980s were also of greater number.15 0 In asserting the influence of
precedent in famous cases such as "Buy Irish"15 1 and through expressions such as "as the Court repeatedly held,"1 5 2 the use of the common law tradition was also a strategy to assert the legitimacy and
coherence of the Court's jurisprudence, showing to a newcomer (the
Republic of Ireland in that case) that even advertising measures
promoted by a private body could fall under the restrictions of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, namely Article 34 TFEU.
Under the influence of the common law tradition and its
adversarial character,1 53 the Court strengthened its oral procedure, allowing judges to entertain possible hearings of submissions from interested parties and, if appropriate, from the
advocate general.1 54 In exceptional cases, the Court can even
reopen a case for oral arguments if it has a sense that a decision
cannot be made without a full discussion of the issues at stake.' 55
Such oral hearings have not always been a pleasant experience
for civil law judges and lawyers in Luxembourg; at times, they
have lengthened the procedure or augmented confusion, instead
of providing clarity to the case.156 However, they have shaped the
legal culture in a way that has enabled the Court to strengthen its
dialogue with the bar and to require that lawyers be prepared to
engage judges in discussion. By the late 1980s, the idea of a moot
court to raise student awareness of EU law and to prepare future
generations of lawyers for oral argument was fully supported by

148. See MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN,
QUASI-CONTRATS 6 (3d ed. 2013).

DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS: RESPONSABILITt CIVILE ET

149. See Michele Graziadei, Rights in the European Landscape:A Historicaland
ComparativeProfile, in THE COHERENCE OF EU LAW 63, 87 (Sacha Prechal & Bert van
Roermund eds., 2008).
150. See Tridimas, supra note 47.
151. See Case 249/81, Comm'n v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005.
152. See Koopmans, supra note 127, at 504 (citing Case 113/80, Comm'n v. Ireland,
1981 E.C.R. 1625, 1639).
153. See R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011).
154. See Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R. 1063
(the first case in which the Court of Justice recognized the right to an oral hearing).
155. See Case 170/78, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417; Koopmans,
supra note 127, at 503 (citing the opinion of Advocate General VerLoren van
Themaat).
156. See Koopmans, supra note 127, at 505.
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the Court's president, Ole Due. Today, it is the most prestigious
moot court on the subject.1 57
B.

Rejecting or IncorporatingLegal Traditionsinto the Fabricof
EU Law

The common law tradition brought changes to the CJEU's jurisprudence and procedure by expanding the rights of parties, such as
the infringement procedure that the Commission can bring before
the Court against the member states under Article 258 TFEU.
Throughout the Commission's proceedings, states are considered litigants with procedural rights of notification and information rather
than "a sinner who ought to repent."ss As a result, the Court has
held that when the Commission fails to fulfill an essential procedural requirement, such defect will taint the judgment in favor of the
state.159
However, with respect to the protection of individuals
through an effective judicial review that ensures the observance
of the rule of law, the CJEU has rejected this aspect of its jurisprudence. 16 0 The tension around the narrow avenue in judicial
review for individuals to challenge general measures became
clear with the 1998 Greenpeace case, in which the environmental organization was denied standing, and led to the subsequent
16 1
opinion delivered by Advocate General Jacobs in the UPA case,
advocating a flexible approach in the interpretation of the test
that individual
for standing, without departing from the notion
concern would fully protect individual rights. 162 Despite a shortlived victory when the opinion was adhered to by the General
Court, the Court of Justice ultimately rejected Advocate General
Jacobs's expansive interpretation. 163 As a result, when there is
onus on
no remedy for private individuals, the Court "puts the
16 4
the national courts to do all they can to create one." Attorney
General Jacobs also noted that his opinion stirred a vigorous
debate, not only among academics but also in relation to the new
drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the new formulation of Article
263(4) TFEU did not create a smoother avenue for individual
157. See History, EUROPEAN LAW MOOT COURT, http://www.europeanlawmootcourt.
eu/History (last visited May 9, 2016).
158. Koopmans, supra note 75, at 22.
159. See Case C-431/92, Comm'n v. Germany, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2189, 2226 (¶ 45).
160. See Angela Ward, Locus Standi Under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty:
Craftinga Coherent Test for a 'Wobbly Polity', 22 Y.B. EUR. L. 45 (2003).
161. See Case C-50/00 P, Uni6n de Pequefios Agricultores v. Council, Opinion of
Advocate General Jacobs, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6677, 6698-702 (¶¶ 59-72).
162. See Rosa Greaves, Commentary on Selected Opinions of Advocate General
Jacobs, 29 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 690, 712-14 (2006).
163. See Case C-50/00 P, Unidn de Pequeflos Agricultores, Judgment, at 6734-36
(1 41-45) (deferring to member states the creation of a system of legal remedies and
procedures that ensure the right to effective judicial protection).
164. See Francis G. Jacob, Effective Judicial Protection of Individuals in the
European Union, Now and in the Future, in THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND 335
(Mads Andenas & John Usher eds., 2003).
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applicants. Rather, because of a slip in the wording of the Lisbon
Treaty, it required further judicial interpretation, ultimately
causing the CJEU to hold that judicial review of "regulatory acts"
is nearly precluded for private applicants.16 5
A similar problem connected with the rejection of an important feature in a particular legal tradition became salient after
the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. These
jurisdictions are committed to the principle of publicity of their
legislative and administrative acts.16 6 In particular, in Sweden,
publicity and access to administrative acts is part of the constitutional order dating back to the country's eighteenth-century
"liberty period."1 6 7 Yet this principle is, at times, at odds with
the tradition of administrative secrecy in France, Germany, and
Britain, and it is clear that the Court will need to use its balancing powers to reconcile the proper functioning of administrative
or judicial proceedings and the openness of such proceedings,
depending on the historical context. The pendulum may have
shifted towards the latter.168"
A final pattern relevant to exploring the dynamic between
legal traditions at work in the fabric of the CJEU's jurisprudence
is the incorporation of national principles into European law. With
the adoption of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
and the democratic guarantees introduced by the Lisbon Treaty,
the anxieties prompted by the Solange saga 1 6 9-namely, that the
EU legal order does not guarantee the same fundamental rights
protected by the member states -appears to be part of German
exceptionalism rather than the norm. 170 In most cases, member
states use fundamental rights enshrined in their legal traditions
as an exception to the free movement rule. Such was the case in
the exemplary Omega ruling, 171 in which an ordinance of the city
of Bonn limited the free movement of services for laser games
because they encroached on the fundamental value of human dignity. The Court upheld the local measure without addressing the
question of the discriminatory nature or cross-border effect of the
165. See Roberto Mastroianni & Andrea Pezza, Access of Individuals to the
European Court of Justice of the European Union Under the New Text of Article 263,
Para4, TFEU, 5 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIrrro PUBBLICO ComuNrrARIo 923 (2014).
166. Carsten Gronbech-Jensen, The Scandinavian Tradition of Open Government
and the European Union: Problems of Compatibility?, 5 J. Eun. PuB. POL'Y 185 (1998).
167. See Koopmans, supra note 75, at 22.
168. Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Sophie in 't Veld, 2014 E.C.R. 11788/14. For
an account of Sophie in 't Veld's struggle to assert that transparency is essential to the democratic process, see Sophie in 't Veld, TransatlanticRelations and
Security: Reflections from a Politician,Practitioner,and Litigator, in A TRANSATLANTIC
COMMUNITY OF LAw: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US
LEGAL ORDERs 237 (Elaine Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014).
169. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29,
1974, 37 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDERSVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 271; BVerfG,
Oct. 22, 1986, 73 BVERFGE 339.
170. See Davies, supra note 78.
171. See Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH
v. Oberbitrgermeisterin der Bundeststadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9609.
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ordinance. 17 2 In Schmidberger v. Austria, the CJEU recognized that
the fundamental rights of free assembly enshrined in the Austrian
constitution and the ECHR could restrict economic freedoms. After
using the conclusive expression "Thus, since both the Community
and its Member States are required to respect fundamental
rights,"1 7 3 the Court delved into the proportionality of the measures implemented by public authorities to give effect to the right
of free assembly.1 74 In doing so, the Court implicitly incorporated
the national and transnational principle into its "legal space ."175
A similar question arose in Sayn-Wittgenstein: could Austrian fundamental rights restrict the economic freedoms of a real estate agent,
obliging her to abandon the title of "Princess" in order to sell castles in
Germany? The real estate agent had used her title of nobility, which
she had acquired in Germany through adoption when she was already
an adult, for at least fifteen years. When the claimant challenged the
Austrian authorities' objection to her adopted name, the Court found
that the principle of equality between citizens that had prompted the
abolition of the nobility in Austria was fully incorporated into EU law. 176
CONCLUSION

Since its inception, the legal reasoning of the CJEU has been conceived by its architects as a legal science based on a comparative exegesis of national legal systems.17 7 This Article suggests revamping a
different strand of comparative legal scholarship derived from positive
sociology functionalism17 8 and the ideology of difference practiced by
the imigr6 jurists to show how national legal traditions play an important role in European jurisprudence.17 9 The call to comparative scholars is to refocus EU law on its different legal formants and implicit
rules or norms such as cryptotypes,'18 0 in order to take advantage of
the rich literature produced by sociologists and historians to cast new
light on the genealogies of legal concepts, the cultural influence, and
the political ideology at work in the jurisprudence of the CJEU.
National legal traditions show the increasing pluralism of a larger
union of twenty-eight member states. But national legal traditions at
work are a strategic rather than merely descriptive tool deployed by
lawyers, judges, and advocates general in Luxembourg to reject or incorporate legal concepts in EU law.
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